Tacit Collusion in Markets Under Regulatory Threat: The Effect of Multimarket Contact on Pricing Strategies

1 July 20261 July 2026

This paper examines how multimarket contact can enable firms to coordinate pricing behaviour under regulatory pressure, using evidence from the Indian pharmaceutical industry.

Authors and affiliations:

• Mirko H. Benischke (Erasmus University, Rotterdam School of Management)
• Ajay Bhaskarabhatla (Erasmus University, Erasmus School of Economics)

Read the full paper here.

Tacit Collusion in Markets Under Regulatory Threat: The Effect of Multimarket Contact on Pricing Strategies

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