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When Private Regulation Develops Teeth: Power and Accountability in Global Supply Chains

Photo taken by the authors, Mahreen Khan, Jimmy Donaghey, Juliane Reinecke

When Rana Plaza collapsed in April 2013, killing more than 1,100 garment workers, two factories inside had been inspected and certified as meeting international standards. Bangladesh had building and labour laws, but enforcement was weak and tied to factory owners’ interests. Global fashion brands filled the regulatory gap with their own codes of conduct, which they financed and managed. 

The failure of these systems raise questions beyond Bangladesh: how can private regulation enforce rules on the companies it depends on for funding and authority? And what happens when a transnational institution, created largely by Global North actors, begins exercising regulatory authority within a Global South state? 

Our research, published in the Journal of Management Studies, examines how the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety gained independence to discipline global brands and their suppliers by incorporating worker voice — and why this provoked resistance from Bangladeshi factory owners and the state.

A decade of change 

The Accord was established weeks after Rana Plaza’s collapse as an agreement between global brands and trade unions, introducing factory inspections, public reporting, remediation pathways and worker complaints’ mechanism. 

We followed the Accord from its formation in 2013 to the post-2020 transition, when Bangladesh operations moved to the nationally registered RMG Sustainability Council (RSC), while the International Accord retained binding commitments over global brands. Our evidence covers eleven years of fieldwork including 155 interviews with brands, unions, NGOs, factory owners, local manufacturers’ association, government and ILO officials, alongside public records. 

How private regulation acquired the power to act 

We extend Nicos Poulantzas’ concept of “relative autonomy” beyond the nation state.  Poulantzas argued that the capitalist state can discipline particular fractions of capital because it is sufficiently independent from specific business interests to constrain them, while still supporting the capitalist system as a whole. We ask what happens when a private, transnational body acquires similar properties. 

The Accord’s independence was never absolute: brands financed it, governed it and provided the commercial leverage on which enforcement depended. But three conditions prevented individual companies from controlling its decisions. 

First, joint governance. Brands and global unions held equal representation in the steering committee, preventing firms from weakening standards when compliance conflicted with commercial interests. 

Second, organisational independence. The Accord was a separate legal entity with its own staff and budget, and its Chief Safety Officer’s technical decisions could not be overruled by brands or suppliers. 

Third, legal enforceability. Binding commitments obliged brands to support remediation, follow escalation procedures and, collectively withdraw orders from suppliers that repeatedly failed to act. 

Together, these turned many brands’ purchasing power into coordinated leverage. By 2020 the Accord had inspected 2,280 factories and remediated over 90 per cent of the hazards found. The Accord’s significance lay not in setting higher standards, but in enforcing existing ones 

Enforcement as provocation 

The Accord’s autonomy came at a political cost. Bangladeshi factory owners were subject to its inspections but excluded from its governance. This exclusion protected safety decisions from supplier influence but allowed domestic industry portray the Accord as a foreign imposition. 

As its authority expanded, factory owners and parts of the state contested its right to regulate, and legal challenges forced the transfer of operations to the RSC in 2020. 

The resulting compromise registered the RSC in Bangladesh and gave local factory owners representation alongside brands and labour, rebalancing global and domestic capitalist power. However, labour’s representation fell from one-half of the Accord’s governing body to one-third of the RSC board, while consensus decision-making allowed domestic industry to delay or block contentious issues. A proposed boiler safety programme took six years to adopt after an explosion killed eleven workers. 

Enforcement became more negotiated and flexible. Under the Accord, more than 200 factories reached advanced escalation or were declared ineligible; after 2021, we found no public record of suppliers being sanctioned. Enforcement also became divided: the International Accord retained binding leverage over brands at the transnational level, while the RSC handled implementation in Bangladesh. 

Why does this matter? 

Private regulation cannot rely on corporate goodwill alone but needs independence, worker representation and credible consequences for non-compliance. Regulatory effectiveness and political sustainability do not necessarily reinforce one another: separating an institution from the actors it regulates can also provoke their resistance. The Accord illustrates this tension. Incorporating domestic capital helped stabilise its successor while diluting labour’s leverage. 

Who does it matter for?  

Brands and retailers. The factory audits they financed and controlled did not prevent Rana Plaza. The Accord showed that credible regulation required companies to accept binding commitments and collective enforcement, including the obligation to withdraw orders from suppliers that repeatedly failed to comply. Joining such arrangements means accepting decisions that individual companies cannot overrule, but that constraint is part of what makes regulation effective. 

States and policymakers. Local participation matters for political legitimacy, particularly when transnational rules operate within Global South countries. But it does not mean greater worker representation. The relevant question is not simply whether local actors are included, but which actors are represented, what decision-making power they have, and whether the institution retains enough independence to regulate the businesses it governs. 

Unions and NGOs. Worker voice needs protection as governance arrangements become more locally embedded. The transition from the Accord to the RSC increased the formal role of Bangladeshi factory owners while reducing labour’s relative representation and making enforcement more negotiated. Greater local ownership and greater worker power should not be treated as equivalent objectives. 

Researchers. The case challenges accounts of Global South states as regulatory vacuums. Bangladesh’s state capacity was uneven and politically selective: public institutions had failed to protect workers, yet judicial, licensing and political authority could be mobilised when the Accord challenged domestic industry and national regulatory control.  

The broader lesson is that North–South power and capital–labour power do not necessarily move in the same direction. Effective private regulation therefore requires attention to both who exercises authority across borders and who holds power within them. 

Read the full article: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joms.70150 

Authors

  • Mahreen Khan

    Mahreen Khan is a Research Fellow at Saïd Business School and Jesus College, University of Oxford. Her research examines how multinational brands, private firms, states and workers contest authority over labour standards in global value chains, and how firms navigate these shifting regulatory environments. Her work with the same co-authors on public, private and joint labour governance in Bangladesh is forthcoming in ILR Review. Her wider research shows that training and promoting women into supervisory roles raised productivity in Bangladesh's garment factories, and examines how social innovations scale through government systems in Asia and Africa. Before her PhD at MIT Sloan, she managed a USD 33 million garment-sector development portfolio for the Netherlands Embassy in Dhaka after the Rana Plaza collapse, as well as working with the ILO's Better Work programme, the IFC and the World Bank.

  • Jimmy Donaghey

    Jimmy Donaghey is Professor of Organisational Behaviour and Human Resources Management at Adelaide University. His research examines how globalisation and global supply chains reshape employment relations, worker voice and the regulation of labour standards. His work spans trade union strategy, social partnership and transnational labour governance, with a longstanding focus on the institutional responses to the Rana Plaza disaster. With Juliane Reinecke, he co-authored Stitching Governance for Labour Rights: Towards Transnational Industrial Democracy? (Cambridge University Press, 2023), based on their longitudinal research on the Bangladesh Accord. He has published widely on worker representation and global labour governance and has co-edited major volumes on employee voice and employment relations.

  • Juliane Reinecke

    Juliane Reinecke is Professor of Management Studies at Saïd Business School, University of Oxford. Her research draws on organisation theory, political philosophy and process studies to examine how transnational governance institutions emerge and evolve, and how multiple stakeholders negotiate more just and sustainable forms of globalisation. Her work spans global supply chains, business and human rights, social movements, political corporate responsibility and sustainability. Her long-running collaboration with Jimmy Donaghey examines labour governance and worker representation in global supply chains. Her research has received awards from the Journal of Management Studies and the Academy of Management. She is a former editor of Administrative Science Quarterly and serves as a trustee of the Society for the Advancement of Management Studies (SAMS), which governs the Journal of Management Studies.